




Information is often modelled as a set of relevant possibilities,
treated as logically possible worlds. However, this has the unintuitive
consequence that the logical consequences of an agent’s information
cannot be informative for that agent. There are many scenarios in
which such consequences are clearly informative for the agent in ques-
tion. Attempts to weaken the logic underlying each possible world are
misguided. Instead, I provide a genuinely psychological notion of epis-
temic possibility and show how it can be captured in a formal model,
which I call a fan. I then show how to use fans to build formal models
of being informed, as well as knowledge, belief and information update.
1 Introduction
I will concentrate on the concept of information which speakers typically
associate with episodes of becoming informed of some event or state of af-
fairs. There is an intuitive notion to be captured here as, for instance, when
I truthfully tell you that you have picked up my laptop instead of your own
and you take what I say to be the case. In such cases, I would expect you
to check which laptop you have in fact picked up and, on discovering it to
be mine, return it to me. Becoming informed, in appropriate circumstances
and with appropriate desires (not to upset me, or break the law) may trigger
predictable action. Following Quine’s and Dennett’s line on other cognitive
notions, one might even claim that the question of just what information is,
is not a question of reduction, say to brain processes or symbolic manipula-
tion. “The problem is not one of hidden facts, such as might be uncovered
by learning more about the brain physiology of thought processes” [Qui70,
p. 180] and as a result, intentional idioms (including “a was informed that
p”) are “practically indispensable” [Qui60, p. 219].
The kind of information under discussion here might be called declara-
tive information, in contrast with procedural or instructive information of
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the kind we find in an instruction manual or cooking recipe. Declarative
information is alethically qualified [Flo05a, p. 3] (i.e. expressions of such
declarative information are truth-apt). Perhaps declarative information is
not so different from other kinds of information. After all, an imperative
can be formed from a declarative: make it the case that p! just as an in-
terrogative can be formed: is it the case that p? One would expect that,
in order to comprehend the latter question, one must first comprehend the
information that would be asserted as ‘p’, were ‘p’ true. That is, one must
know what information p would convey, were it true. In a similar way, one
must know what information p would contain, were it true, in order to follow
the instruction: make it the case that p!1
There are conflicting intuitions concerning declarative information. One
is that a set of premises must contain all of the information contained in their
consequences. On this view, as Wittgenstein has it, “there can never be sur-
prises in logic” [Wit22, §6.1251]. Information is an objective phenomenon,
such that there may be information which no one could ever cognise (be-
cause, for example, of the finite number of fundamental particles in the
universe—just pick a propositional tautology containing more propositional
letters than this). On the other hand, we have the intuition just mentioned,
that becoming informed disposes an agent with appropriate desires to act
in a certain way. This is only possible if the agent could, given its cognitive
limitations, realise that it was so informed.
The former intuition concerns a static notion of an information state,
the latter a dynamic one (or, as Floridi makes the distinction elsewhere in
this volume, we have statal and actional notions of information [Flo06]).
Intuitively, the two should be connected by the principle that the dynamic
notion of information is no more than the disposition to update one (static)
information state to another. There is a notion of information which does
not conform to this principle: that of, say, a book containing the information
that p, for one cannot inform a book! The difference here is that the sense
of information appealed to is not a cognitive sense. Nevertheless, we should
only say that a non-cognitive system (such as a book) contains information
when it is able to effect a change in a cognitive information state (i.e. by
being read). Thus, information must at bottom be potential information for
someone. I hold that there could not be information that, as a matter of
necessity, could not be known.
1The proviso that ‘p’ be true reflects that fact that information must be truthful, that
is, misinformation is not information at all.
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2 Information Update
One of the key directions in the logical analysis of information is to treat
an agent’s static information state as the set of all relevant possibilities that
she entertains (e.g. [VB03]). If agent a knows that p∨ q, but does not know
which disjunct is true, there are three relevant ways in which the world could
be, given what a knows. There are worlds in which p is true but q false,
worlds in which q is true but p false, and worlds in which both are true.
Assuming negation behaves classically, we may talk of the three kinds of
possibilities as p¬q worlds, ¬pq worlds and pq worlds. If the agent is then
informed that p is false—in the sense that a accepts the information to be
true—then two of these possibilities are ruled out. The p¬q and pq worlds
are ruled out of a’s considerations, leaving only the ¬pq worlds as candidates
for how the world could be (that is, given what information a has). For any
agent in a’s initial information state, containing the information that p ∨ q,
the additional information that ¬p also contains the information that q, just






Figure 1: Updating by ¬p
As mentioned in the introduction, we have both a static and a dynamic
notion of information. We might contrast being informed that φ, in the
sense φ is part of the agent’s current state of information, with becoming
informed that φ as an active, dynamic process. In the former category, we
have the informational state of agent a at a particular time. This is modelled
by saying that the information which a has does not discriminate between
certain kinds of worlds; a cannot tell whether the actual world is a ¬pq world,
a p¬q world or a pq world. Formally, we treat epistemic indistinguishability
for agent a as a relation ∼a on possible worlds, such that w1 ∼a w2 means
that a’s information does not distinguish between w1 and w2. If w1 differs
from w2 in that r is true at the former but not the latter, then w1 ∼a w2
implies that a’s information state does not include the information that r,
or that ¬r. An information state, then, is modelled by a class of worlds
which the agent cannot distinguish between.
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Intuitively, the larger this class of indistinguishable worlds is, the less
information the agent possesses. Information is a tool which an agent can
use to discriminate the actual world from merely possible ones. Our dynamic
sense of information, then, is a narrowing of the class of indistinguishable
worlds. Genuine information never excludes the actual world in this process,
if it were there to begin with, but misinformation may of course cause a
trusting agent to consider things to be other than they actually are. It is
the information contained in a declarative utterance that causes this change
in an agent’s information state. Therefore, we may model the informational
content of p as an update on agent a’s indistinguishability relation ∼a such
that, after the update, a can distinguish those worlds in which p holds from
those in which it does not.
It should be pointed out that the kind of world we have been discussing
cannot be the traditional philosophical notion of a metaphysically possible
world. For example, it is informative to learn that water is H2O and yet,
since this is a true identity statement, it is a necessary truth. ‘Water is
H2O’ holds in all possible worlds that contain water (see [Kri80]). But if
it is informative to an agent that water is H2O, they must have previously
entertained the possibility of water and H2O being distinct. It is common
to term such possibilities epistemic possibilities (e.g. [Hin62]), but it is not
often remarked just how different from genuine, metaphysical worlds such
possibilities actually are, either in Lewis’ sense of genuine concrete entities
[Lew86] or Kripke’s more parsimonious notion of ways the world could have
been. I will return to this line of thought in section 5—suffice to say here
that the terminology worlds is rather misleading. The logical points that we
take to be epistemic possibilities can only be just that—logical points, and
hence we can obtain at most a formal model of information. An account
of what information is remains parasitic on a genuine account of epistemic
possibility.
There is a clear relation between this notion of informational content and
knowledge update. Following Hintikka [Hin62], a static account of knowledge
can be given in terms of the worlds that an agent cannot distinguish betwen.
Agent a knows that φ in a state s iff φ is true at all states s′ which a cannot
distinguish from s. Gaining new knowledge is thus a matter of restricting
indistinguishability between worlds, i.e. of restricting ∼a. The information
contained within φ, then, is on a par with the change in a’s epistemic state
when it comes to know that φ.
In linking information to knowledge, there are two points that should be
raised. Firstly, some view information as true by definition; misinformation
is not a subspecies of information at all, but only pseudo-information [Flo05a].
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Those who hold that information may be false should talk of a change in an
agent’s belief state, rather than its state of knowledge. Secondly, the logic
of information may well be stronger than the logic of knowledge (even the
knowledge of ideal agents, as described by Hintikka). I have described the
indistinguishability relation as one which engenders partitions on the total
set of worlds such that, from within a certain partition, an update simply
makes certain worlds vanish (as in figure 1).2
In the remainder of the paper, I will investigate an unintuitive conse-
quence of this framework: an agent cannot be informed about the conse-
quences of its knowledge, and logical truths cannot be informative. In section
3, I will argue that this is unacceptable. However, the problem cannot be
avoided by weakening the underlying logic (section 4). The problem is not
to be located within the analysis of information just sketched itself. Rather,
the problem arises with a false conception of epistemic possibility, which
also plagues epistemic logic. I propose an alternative notion of epistemic
possibility in section 5 and show how it results in an improved account of
knowledge, belief and information.
3 Informative Inference
Let us say that a sentence φ is informative for an agent a when an utter-
ance of it could cause a change in a’s information state. Now consider the
following two cases:
1. Suppose a is in informed that φ→ ψ and φ. Can ψ then be informa-
tive?
2. Suppose φ → ψ is valid. If a is informed that φ, can ψ then be
informative?
According to the account of being informed as an indistinguishability rela-
tion ∼ on worlds, and of becoming informed as an update on ∼, the answer to
both questions is no. In the first case, after becoming informed that φ→ ψ
and that φ, a first excludes all worlds in which φ ∧ ¬ψ is true, and then
excludes worlds in which ¬φ is true. There only remain worlds at which ψ
2Each∼ is thus an equivalence relation, which is too strong for an analysis of knowledge.
The scheme ¬Kφ → K¬Kφ (i.e. whenever an agent does not know something, it knows
that it does not know it) is S5-valid but, even in the case of agents with ideal reasoning
ability, this is implausible. It is more common to take a logic between S4 and S5 (including
S4 itself) to be the correct logic of knowledge, such that Kφ → KKφ is valid. I comment
briefly on this so-called KK-principle (valid on all transitive frames) in section 5 below.
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is true; hence becoming informed that ψ produces no update effect. This is
a case of closure under informed implication. Suppose an agent has the in-
formation that φ→ ψ. Then being informed that φ implies being informed
that ψ and becoming informed that φ implies becoming informed that ψ.
As a consequence, being informed that φ is analysed as exactly the same
state as being informed that ψ, and becoming informed that φ as the same
event as becoming informed that ψ, whenever the agent has the information
that φ↔ ψ.
In the second case, a is informed that φ, so excludes worlds where ¬φ
holds. But since φ → ψ is valid, it holds at all worlds, hence ψ also holds
at all worlds which a considers possible. Then updating by ψ produced no
change in the worlds which a considers possible, hence ψ has no informative
content over and above φ. This is a case of closure under valid implication.
As a consequence, being informed that φ is necessarily the same state as
being informed that ψ, and becoming informed that φ is necessarily the
same event as becoming informed that ψ, whenever φ and ψ are logically
equivalent.
This has been termed the problem of information overload.3 If an agent
is informed that φ, it is also informed of the infinite number of sentences
which follow logically from φ. Thus the consequences of a set of sentences
contain at most the informational content that the sentences themselves
contain. The view is very much that the conclusion is contained in the
premises. So long as we remain within the possible worlds framework, infor-
mation overload in some form or another cannot be avoided. Both closure
under informed and under valid implication are present in the weakest nor-
mal logic of knowledge, K.4 I the case of knowledge, rather than information,
many find this consequence of the possible worlds framework implausible.
Hintikka explicitly says that there are a, φ, ψ such that a knows that φ, φ
logically implies ψ and yet a does not know that ψ [Hin75, p. 476]. The ques-
tion to be discussed, then, is whether the same holds of being and becoming
informed.
As a special case of closure under valid implication, this account of in-
formation implies that tautologies cannot be informative at all. According
to Floridi [Flo05b], “most philosophers agree that tautologies convey no
3In the case of knowledge, rather than information, the problem is termed logical
omniscience. See [Sta91, Whi03] for discussions of this related problem.
4It is possible to use Scott-Montague semantics to model knowledge, according to which
∼ relates sets of worlds, but then one loses the intuition about information update as a
restriction of epistemic possibility. Besides, information remains closed under equivalent
sentences.
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information at all.” This is partly because the informativeness of a state-
ment is often linked to how likely that statement is to be true, such that
the informativeness of p is inversely related to the subjective probability of
p. Thus tautologies, which have a probability of 1, are completely uninfor-
mative.5 Floridi defends this conception elsewhere in this volume, calling
tautologies “empty” of informational content: “If the information that p
is “empty” . . . as it is the case of e.g. a tautology . . . then a can hold
the (empty) information that [p], but cannot be informed by receiving it”
[Flo06]. Wittgenstein expressed a somewhat similar idea in the Tractatus in
saying that tautologies literally lack sense (are sinnlos). ⊢ φ → ψ literally
says nothing (although it does show something, namely that ψ follows from
φ) [Wit22, §§4 ff]. If one wants to know whether to take an umbrella, it is
completely uninformative to be told that either it is raining or it is not.
However, this last example, which seemingly highlights the informational
emptiness of tautologies, is a sentence whose tautological nature could be
recognised by any competent speaker of the language. Now, if a sentence
is a tautology, then the fact that it is a tautology is also a tautology (of
the metalanguage, rather than the object language). The sentence ‘φ is a
tautology’ is true precisely when ⊢φ in the propositional calculus (hence ‘is
a tautology’ obeys a disquotation scheme for tautologies just as ‘is true’ does
for truths.) It follows that ‘φ is a tautology’ cannot be informative. If true,
it is ‘empty’; if false, it is misinformation. However, for someone who does
not recognise the tautological character of some complicated sentence φ, it
may well be informative to learn that φ is a tautology. A simple example
is of a student, sitting a logic exam, asked to say which of the sentences
written on the exam paper are tautologies. Given that students frequently
get the answer to such questions wrong, our student may certainly find it
helpful to have the answers. But how could the answers be helpful if they
are not informative?
In the remainder of this section, I describe several cases that highlight
that how a consequence ψ of information an agent already possesses can
nevertheless be informative. In these scenarios, the only sensible explanation
of the agent’s behaviour will be: the agent learnt something new and, in so
learning, became informed.
5This has the unintuitive result that contradictions have maximum informational con-
tent. This is known as the Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox; their conclusion is that contra-
dictions are “too informative to be true” [BH64, p. 229]. The problem is avoided by
taking informativeness to imply truth, as I have done here, although the elegance of the
mathematical model is then lost.
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Scenario 1 Genuine mathematical theorems are true in all possible worlds,
so that discovering a proof for a theorem should not be informative (or
rather, it may be informative that one can write a proof in this way, but not
that one exists at all). But this is at stark odds with the way mathematicians
behave. For example, Andrew Wiles reports a moment in 1986:
Casually in the middle of a conversation [a] friend told me that
Ken Ribet had proved a link between [the] Taniyama-Shimura
[hypothesis] and Fermat’s Last Theorem. I was electrified. I
knew that moment that the course of my life was changing.
[Wil06]
What was the source of this electrifying moment? We would say that
the cause was the friend’s informing Wiles of the link. Wiles gained new
information—necessarily true, a priori information—which allowed him to
continue (and eventually complete) his proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem.
Lest we be tempted to think that there was really no new information here,
here is how Wiles himself described the process of completing the proof:
You enter the first room of the mansion and it’s completely dark.
You stumble around bumping into the furniture but gradually
you learn where each piece of furniture is. Finally, after six
months or so, you find the light switch, you turn it on, and
suddenly it’s all illuminated. You can see exactly where you
were. [Wil06]
Being able to see objects previously hidden is a paradigmatic case of percep-
tual information; Wiles’ metaphor of illumination explicitly links this type
of information acquisition to the psychology of mathematical discovery.
Scenario 2 Early in the summer of 1902, the second volume of Frege’s
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik was in press. In the Grundgesetze, Frege sets
down his logicist principles and attempts to derive arithmetic from the stable
foundations of his logic. Russell’s famous letter to Frege of June 16 pointed
out that Frege’s system was inconsistent. Basic Law V—the abstraction
principle, stating that any concept determines a set—had allowed Russell
to derive a contradiction similar to the one Burali-Forti had discovered in
1897.6 Frege immediately began asking questions: “Is it always permissible
6Russell discovered his paradox in the late spring of 1901 and describes the effect
his discovery had on him: “At first I supposed that I should be able to overcome the
contradiction quite easily, and that probably there was some trivial error in the reasoning.
Gradually, however, it became clear that this was not the case” [Rus69].
8
to speak of the extension of a concept, of a class? And if not, how do we
recognize the exceptional cases?” [Fre64, p. 127]. It is evident that Frege’s
viewpoint had changed completely by 1903. How are we to explain his
change of mind? Frege explicitly tells us that his worries were “raised by
Mr Russell’s communication” [Fre64, p. 127]. We would most naturally say
that Russell informed Frege of the paradox contained within Basic Law V
and that it was becoming informed of this that caused Frege to abandon
logicism.
Scenario 3 Formal verification via model checking is a technique exten-
sively used in industry as a way of checking that certain properties hold of
a system at the design stage. A formal model of the system is developed
and used to check whether it satisfies a certain property, for example, that
two users can never access the same account at the same time, or that the
algorithm can never enter a cycle from which it will never exit. Even in
seemingly simple systems, the number of possible states of the system can
be enormous, which is why a formal tool for checking through all such states
is required. It has often been the case that model checking has shown up
unexpected flaws in the design, which then has to be rethought. Suppose
we have a design that we wish to test and a formal model has been build.
We might think that our system can never enter a state at which property
φ holds. What then is the purpose of model checking whether φ is satisfied
by the model? Model checking verifies that either φ holds or does not. It is
therefore natural to say that the model checker will output information as
to whether our design is as safe or reliable as we hope it is. If there is a flaw
in our design, the model checker will inform us of this.
All of these scenarios are examples of either case 1 or 2 above. They are
cases in which someone is genuinely informed by sentences which, according
to the update account of information, have no right to be called informative.
We can only conclude that there is something wrong with the update model
of information.
4 Avoiding Information Overload
It is instructive to cast the problem along the lines of Hintikka’s analysis of
the closure of knowledge in [Hin75] as follows:
1. ‘a is informed that that φ’ is true at w iff φ is true at every world
indistinguishable from w;
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2. There are a, φ, ψ such that a is informed that φ, φ logically implies ψ
and yet ψ can be informative for a;
3. A sentence is logically true iff it is true at every possible world;
4. All indistinguishable worlds related by ∼ are logically possible.
(1-4) are clearly inconsistent; I call this Hintikka’s problem. In the case of
knowledge, Hintikka immediately argues that (2) is not the culprit [Hin75,
p. 476]—that is, there really are such sentences, so related. Instead, he pro-
poses to reject (4) and claim that not all such worlds are logically possible:
“the source of the trouble is obviously the last assumption (4) which is usu-
ally made tacitly, maybe even unwittingly. It is what prejudices the case
in favour of logical omniscience” [Hin75, p. 476] and hence of information
overload. Hintikka’s reason for supposing that indistinguishable worlds need
not be logically possible is as follows.
Just because people . . . may fail to follow the logical conse-
quences of what they know ad infinitum, they may have to keep a
logical eye on options which only look possible but which contain
hidden contradictions [Hin75, p. 476].
The worlds which are indistinguishable by a should not be thought of as
giving us the possibilities left open by the information that a has. Rather,
they should give us the apparent possibilities—apparent, that is, given a’s
ability to follow the logical consequences of the information she has.
Hintikka devotes the remainder of his article [Hin75, pp. 477–483] to
describing impossible possible worlds, logical models which are inconsistent
from a classical point of view, but “so subtly inconsistent that the incon-
sistency could not be expected to be known (perceived) by an everyday
logician, however competent” [Hin75, p. 478].7 Suppose an agent considers
the sentences satisfied by such a model to state genuine possibilities. That
agent will thereby be taking some impossibilities to be possible and, in doing
so, will not have all valid sentences in her information state. We therefore
have some handle on her logical competence, depending on the degree to
which contradictions in the model manifest themselves.
7The terminology ‘impossible possible worlds’ is perhaps not the most advisable.
Better suggestions include nonclassical in [Cre72, Cre73] and nonstandard in [RB79].
Levesque claims a different methodology in [Lev84], using a notion of a situation (al-
though Levesque’s situations are remarkably similar to Cresswell’s nonclassical worlds
[Cre72, Cre73]).
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The details of such models are provided by Rantala in [Ran75], where
he uses the term urn models. The domain is conceived as a huge urn from
which individuals may be drawn (the urn metaphor is taken from elementary
probability theory). Sequences of quantifiers embedded one within the scope
of another are restrictions on draws from the urn. Now, a classical model is
one in which the contents of the urn remains constant between draws—such
models are known as invariant models. Rantala then considers changing
models, whose urn has a mechanism attached which may alter the contents
from one draw to the next. In this way, sentences which are classically invalid
may nevertheless be satisfied by an urn model. The level of inconsistency
in a urn model is viewed as the number of draws which occur before any
change in the available individuals takes place. Suppose the largest number
of nested quantifiers in a sentence φ is d (d is said to be the depth of φ).
Then, if the domain/urn in a model M remains constant for at least the
first d draws, M will agree with classical models as to the validity or logical
falsehood of φ. Such models are called d-invariant.
Hintikka’s idea is to use the parameter d as a measure of an agent’s logical
competency, for sentences with deeply embedded quantifiers are harder to
understand than those without. The more competent the agent, therefore,
the larger the value of d. An agent whose competency is d will be able to
recognise the validity of all valid sentences whose depth does not exceed d,
but might get it wrong in the case of more complex sentences. By taking
possible worlds to be urn models, the update account can explain how a
sentence φ with quantifier depth d′ > d can be informative to an agent
a whose competence is d, even when φ follows from information which a
already has. There will be worlds which a considers possible at which φ
is false (these are the d′′-invariant models, where d < d′′ ≤ d′) so that, on
becoming informed that φ, ∼a is updated to exclude these worlds.
However, for any particular d, an agent’s information state either in-
cludes all or no valid sentences of depth d. If its competence is no less than
d, then all valid sentences of depth d are ‘empty’ of information. Assum-
ing our agent has rudimentary logical competency, all sentences containing
no embedded quantifiers, including all propositional tautologies, are empty
of information for that agent. Thus neither depth-1 formulae nor proposi-
tional tautologies can ever be informative. Moreover, at least some complex
sentences (say of quantifier depth d) are likely to be informative for an
agent, but this should not prohibit the agent from having previously been
informed of any valid sentence of that depth.8 Thus, Hintikka’s solution
8Similar examples are discussed in [Jag06a, ch. 2].
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does not avoid these unintuitive consequences in the case of information.
There are other approaches which share Hintikka’s feeling that (4) is the
problematic premise in Hintikka’s problem, i.e. epistemic possibilities need
not be treated as classical logically possible worlds. They also retain Hin-
tikka’s notion that each epistemic possibility must be some kind of logical
model, but with a notion of consequence that is weaker than in classical logic.
Cresswell [Cre73] describes nonclassical worlds, which are essentially based
on a paraconsistent logic, where negation behaves in nonstandard ways such
that the truth of φ does not necessarily exclude the truth of ¬φ. A 4-valued
approach to truth underlies Levesque’s logic of explicit belief [Lev84]. The
logic within Levesque’s worlds is based on Belnap’s 4-valued logic [AB75]
and Dunn [Dun76], which makes use of a truth relation on {true, false}
rather than a function). A similar account is given by Fagin, Halpern and
Vardi in [FHV90]. The semantics here is based on the Routley star operator
approach to relevant logic (see [DR02]). What all these approaches have in
common is that not all classical tautologies hold at all worlds, allowing the
satisfaction clause for ‘a is informed that φ’ to be given in terms of indistin-
guishable worlds without generating Hintikka’s problem. As a consequence,
we have an account of worlds which can be used in the update account of
information to model an agent genuinely becoming informed about some
(classical) consequence of information it already possesses.
However, a version of Hintikka’s problem can be generated relative to
whatever logic underlies such worlds. Suppose that this logic is Λ. If Λ has
recursive truth conditions, so that there are infinitely many theorems of Λ,
then the following should be true:
2.′ There are a, φ, ψ such that a has been informed that φ, φ Λ-entails ψ
and yet ψ is informative for a.
Yet, ψ will be true at all such worlds and so 2′ comes out false. Adding
2′ to 1, 3, 4 generates a contradiction similar to Hintikka’s problem. As a
consequence, any agent who has been informed that φ cannot possibly be
informed that ψ when φ Λ-entails ψ; and any Λ-valid sentence will have no
informative content whatsoever.
On reflection, weakening the internal logic of worlds seems a badly mo-
tivated move, because it denies agents information of the classical principles
which are not principles of the chosen logic. The fact that real agents do
not suffer from information overload is not due to their lacking reasoning
principles, as if they somehow did not know how to apply modus ponens or
the law of excluded middle. Rather, agents have bounded resources—time,
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memory, attention and the like—which limit what an agent can derive from
the information it already has.
We should conclude that this notion of epistemic possibility is thoroughly
flawed. I develop an alternative conception in the following sections. Before
I do, I want to evaluate a rather different approach. Rather than reject-
ing premise 4 of Hintikka’s problem, we might adapt Fagin and Halpern’s
account in [FH88] and suggest that agents are indeed overloaded with the
consequences of the information they possess, but that such consequences
are filtered through an ‘awareness’ filter, thus avoiding the problem in prac-
tise. Agents can only use information that they are aware of and hence may
think that some consequence of their information is informative (whereas in
fact it cannot be).
Awareness is a purely syntactic notion. It is therefore possible to alter the
properties of awareness without modifying the underlying possible worlds
account of information. We need not specify properties of the awareness
set a priori, but “[o]nce we have a concrete interpretation in mind, we may
want to add some restrictions” [FH88, p. 54]. However, it seems essential to
the success of the awareness model that, in general, awareness sets have no
closure properties whatsoever. As Fagin and Halpern comment,
people do not necessarily identify formulas such as ψ∧φ and φ∧
ψ. Order of presentation does seem to matter. And a computer
program that can determine whether φ ∧ ψ follows from some
initial premises in time τ might not be able to determine whether
ψ ∧ φ follows from those premises in time τ . [FH88, p. 53, their
emphasis]
However, given a concrete formulation of awareness we may ask, why could
this notion not be used to define a notion of being and becoming informed
directly, using whatever principles were used to determine the properties of
the awareness set? A potential notion of awareness given in [FH88, 54] is
that the elements of the awareness set are precisely those sentences that the
agent could determine as consequences of information they already possess
in a specified space and/or time bound. This is, roughly, the notion I will
propose below, although I will do so directly in terms of a possible worlds
analysis, making no use of the evidently spurious notion of awareness.
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5 Epistemic possibility
In the introduction, I remarked that epistemic possibilities are unlike meta-
physical possibilities in that the latter, but not the former, are captured by
appeal to possible worlds as a genuine feature of being. Epistemic possi-
bilities, on the other hand, are (in part) psychological notions. Of course,
psychological attitudes are part of being as well. Beliefs and desires really do
exist but, according to Dennett, they “can be discerned only from the point
of view of one who adopts a certain predictive strategy, and [their] existence
can be confirmed only by an assessment of the success of that strategy”
[Den87, p. 15]. In [Jag06a], I discuss a formal model of belief which makes
use of Dennett’s predictive strategy but, unlike his account, does not assume
that agents are ideally rational reasoners.
In the remainder of this section, I introduce these structures and show
how they can be used to develop an account of epistemic possibility. Such
structures appeal to what an agent could determine given limited resources.
This is similar in some respects to Fagin and Halpern’s notion of awareness
as the sentences that an agent could determine in a specified space and/or
time bound, but treated as a genuine semantic notion. Consider an agent
wondering whether this or that set of sentences is compatible with prior
information. If the agent can find no explicit contradiction between this
information and the set of sentences, then it has no reason to suppose that
those sentences do not describe the way things actually are. We can turn
this idea around and say that any arbitrary set of sentences that the agent
could not recognise an explicit contradiction in, given limited resources, may
take the place of an epistemic possibility. We can then develop an account
of information (as well as knowledge and belief) in more or less the standard
way.
Fix a denumerable set of propositional letters P and let L be the smallest
language closed under P and the usual Boolean connectives and the senten-
tial operator ‘E’. Models are relational structures whose domain is a set of
points S (which, following standard practise will be called states). Assum-
ing we model a group of n agents, models contain two kinds of relations,
namely a serial transition relation T and the indistinguishability relations
∼i for each agent i. For simplicity of explication, assume that T forms a
number of unconnected tree structures on S.9 We also have a labelling func-
tion V that labels each state s ∈ S with a set of non-modal sentences of L
9The restriction to models in tree form is inessential, as it is a theorem of normal modal
logics that every model is bisimilar to a tree model. See, for example, [BdRV02].
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and a function ρ which assigns a set of inference rules to each agent. It is im-
portant that the sentences which hold at a state are not deductively closed.
In what follows, I assume that ρ assigns at least conjunction introduction
to each agent.10
The particularity of the models we are interested in comes in the way
that T and the ∼is are fixed. Whenever Tsu, we say that there is a transition
from s to u. These transitions model potential atomic inferences—the act of
inferring just one new formula from those that hold at parent states. Thus
whenever Tsu holds, u must be labelled just like s except that, in addition,
u is labelled by some additional formula. For some formula φ, we have
V (u) = V (s) ∪ {φ} whenever Tsu. Here, I say that u extends s by φ. A
state s may be extended by a formula φ when φ is the conclusion of a rule of
inference whose premises match the sentences which label s (or rather, since
such rules tend to be meta-rules containing sentence-variables, we should
talk about φ being the conclusion under some substitution instance of a
rule whose premises, under that same substitution, are all labels of s). In a
modelM , whenever a state s may be so extended, there is a state u suitably
extending s such that Tsu.11
Models also contain a function δ assigning a natural number to each
agent, which represents how many inferences (applications of the rules as-
signed to the agent by ρ) an agent may perform before its resources run out.
Now, if the entire tree represents the reasoning possibilities of an ideal agent,
with one possible line of reasoning per branch, we can limit our attribution
of rationality by chopping off each of the branches in the tree at depth δ.
We might imagine a wedge-shaped fan, whose sides are of length δ, held over
the tree so that its sides run parallel to the outermost branches of the tree.
The area within the fan represents reasoning which the agent can perform
before its resources run out. An example will illuminate this idea.
Consider the tree τ1 whose root s1 is labelled by {p ∨ q ∨ r,¬p,¬q,¬r}
and suppose all agents can use the rule
φ ∨ ψ ∨ χ ¬φ
ψ ∨ χ
and, for the sake of the example, assume agents can rearrange disjuncts
instantaneously (so rearrangement does not cost a transition). Clearly V (s1)
10This allows us to say in the syntax of our language that there is a state in which both
φ and ψ hold. Since these sentences are not deductively closed, this is not equivalent to
φ ∧ ψ holding. When s  ♦nφ and s  ♦nψ, we can write s  ♦n♦(φ ∧ ψ) to say that φ
and ψ hold in the same state, n transitions away from s.
11Such models are considered in more detail in [Jag06c, Jag06b].
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is inconsistent and a contradictory pair can be derived in two applications
of the above rule. But suppose we have an agent a which, because of lack
of resources perhaps, can only reason to depth 1, i.e. δa = 1. Then s1
will appear consistent to a (assume a has no further rules for dealing with
disjunctions). In considering an agent b such that δb > 1, we should exclude
the fan beginning at s1 from our considerations: it is not epistemically
possible for b. But we do not have to exclude this fan in the case of agent
a, as a could not recognise the contradiction, given its resource bounds.
Let us now see how we can define being informed, as well as knowledge,
belief and epistemic possibility, within this framework. Suppose a and b both
have the information that p ∨ q ∨ r, that ¬p and that ¬q and that δa = 1
whereas δb > 1. I think it is natural to say that b also has the available
information that r, whereas a does not, for there is no possible way for a to
access or make use of such information. This intuition is even more forceful
in the case of knowledge: agent b knows that r but a does not, for a has
no way to recognise that r follows from what it does know. Agent b can
distinguish between s1 and s2, because however it reasons, it will sooner or
later realise that the labels of s1 (but not of s2) are inconsistent. Agent a,
on the other hand, cannot; so we have s1 ∼a s2, but s1 6∼b s2. The situation
is represented in figure 2—assume that both points are reflexive. I shall talk










Figure 2: Epistemic possibilities as fans
For any agent i, we only allow s ∼i u when the u fan contains no explicit
contradictions at a single state. I count both a contradictory pair φ,¬φ and
a contradictory conjunction φ∧¬φ as explicit contradictions.12 Let us write
T nsu when u can be reached from s via n T -transitions. We then have
s ∼a u only if both {φ,¬φ} 6⊆ V (u
′) and φ ∧ ¬φ /∈ V (u′), where T δauu′, for
12Recall that labels of states are not deductively closed, so these conditions are dis-
tinct. Yet both states at which φ,¬φ hold and those at which φ ∧ ¬φ hold are intuitively
objectionable.
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any φ. As a first approximation, suppose we model an agent’s information
state in the usual way: agent a has the information that φ at s iff φ appears
in all fans which a cannot distinguish from s. Formally, s  Iiφ iff, for all
s′ ∈ S, s ∼i s
′ implies s′  ♦δiφ.
However, as mentioned above, one can only have the information that
φ if φ is true. Misinformation is not a species of information at all. We
cannot guarantee that φ holds whenever ‘Iiφ’ holds simply by taking ∼i to
be reflexive, as we would in a regular modal logic of information. Fans are
in effect ways of reasoning, rather than possible states of affairs. They are
genuine epistemic notions and this is why they need not be consistent. But
information must be true and thus consistent. We therefore add to the model
a set of additional states S∗ and a function ∗ on states, associating each
state s ∈ S ∪ S∗ with a state s∗ ∈ S∗ such that s∗∗ = s∗ and V (s∗) = V (s).
We then close the sentences satisfied by states s∗ ∈ S∗ under the usual
satisfaction rules for Booleans, i.e. s∗  ¬φ iff s∗ 1 φ, and s∗  φ ∧ ψ iff
s∗  φ and s∗  ψ. Thus, if V (s) is classically inconsistent, V (s∗) will
contain all non-modal formulae in the language. On the other hand, if V (s)
is classically consistent, s∗ will behave as a classical possible world.
The correct analysis of an information state is therefore: agent a has the
information that φ at s iff s∗ is consistent and φ appears in all fans which a
cannot distinguish from s. Formally,
s  Iiφ iff s
∗
1 ⊥ and, for all s′, s ∼a s
′ implies that s′  ♦δaφ
Thus, at states s for which s∗ is not a possible world (i.e. V (s) is classically
inconsistent), an agent has no information at all. Intuitively, s∗ gives us
the truths which hold in the situation in which the reasoning episode at s
takes place. We then add a new modality ‘T’, with ‘Tφ’ read as ‘φ is true’
such that, for any s ∈ S ∪ S∗, s  Tφ iff s∗  φ and s∗  φ. This latter
proviso rules out ‘true contradictions’. Here, the truth modality only applies
to consistent states. It follows from these definitions that Iiφ→ Tφ is valid
for any agent i. In our above example (figure 2), we see that agent a has
the information that p ∨ q ∨ r at s2 but merely has misinformation at s1.
Next, I turn to epistemic possibility, a phrase that can be somewhat
misleading. The intended sense of ‘epistmeic possibility’ is that φ is epis-
temically possible for an agent a when, for a, is is epistemically open whether
φ is true or not. Let us write ‘s  Eaφ’ when this is so at a state s. Again,
we capture this notion in terms of fans indistinguishable from s by a. For-
mally, s  Eiφ iff there is a state s
′ such that s ∼i s
′ and s′  ♦δiφ. Given
these definitions, it might be thought that epistemic possibility is just the
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dual of being informed, in the sense that being informed closes some of the
agent’s previously epistemically open questions. However, this is not the
case. Whilst Eiφ implies ¬Ii¬φ, ¬Ei¬φ does not imply that Iiφ. There could
well be a state s, indistinguishable from the current state, at which neither
♦δiφ nor ♦δi¬φ hold. It seems to be characteristic of epistemic possibilities
that they may be partial, as well as inconsistent (but not obviously contra-
dictory) descriptions of states of affairs. ‘E’ is not the dual of a knowledge
or belief operator for similar reasons.
Let us call this the bounded rationality account of being informed. It
essential to this account that the set of non-modal sentences which are sat-
isfied at a state s is not deductively closed. For example, Iiφ and Iiφ → ψ
does not imply Iiψ. However, there is nothing preventing our ascription
sentences—those sentences of the form Iiφ and Eiφ—from being closed un-
der classical consequence. If agent a has the information that φ, then this
is a fact about the world and such facts should behave just like any other.
So, for example, s  Iiφ and s  Iiψ implies s  Iiφ ∧ Iiψ, but Iiφ ∧ Iiψ
is not equivalent to Ii(φ ∧ ψ). ‘Ii’ does not distribute over implication or
conjunction. The same holds for ‘E’.
Conditions on the ∼i relation do not have their usual effect on these log-
ics. For example, seriality does not guarantee consistency, as states them-
selves may be inconsistent; and reflexivity does not guarantee truth, for it is
not correct to say that the sentences satisfied in some epistemic possibility
are true there. A sufficiently complex falsehood might be considered possi-
ble, but cannot be true. What is true at s is not what is satisfied at s, but
rather what is satisfied at s∗, provided that ⊥ is not also satisfied there. On
the other hand, Iiφ→ IiIiφ is valid when ∼i is transitive. On the presenta-
tion here, each ∼i may or may not be transitive. Whether each should be
transitive is another question. According to the explanation I have given of
fans, they tell us what an agent with fixed resources could become aware of,
not what they are aware of. Thus, ∼i should be transitive iff agent i cannot
be aware that φ follows from its prior information without being aware that
it is so aware.
An account of knowledge can be given along the lines of the logic of being
informed, with the exception that the relation underlying the definition of
knowledge should not be transitive, for agents do not always know what
they know. Knowledge depends partly on how one’s beliefs co-vary across
worlds [Noz81].13 Thus, if one holds that becoming informed implies gaining
knowledge, then one should also hold that the relation ‘∼i’ used to model
13See [AC05] for a recent defence of a tracking-theory approach to knowledge.
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being informed should not be transitive. Whether being informed implies
gaining knowledge turns on whether one considers, for instance, a stopped
clock to be informative on the two occasions a day when it tells the right
time.
An account of belief can also be given in the same way as the logic of
being informed by dropping the restriction to consistent states. That is, an
agent’s beliefs may be inconsistent. If the same underlying indistinguisha-
bility relation is used to model both knowledge and belief, then knowledge
implies belief (i.e. Kiφ→ Biφ is valid). It is of course possible to introduce
two families of relations, ∼Ki and ∼
B
i for each agent i so that the properties
of knowledge and belief become decoupled allowing, for example, the latter
but not the former to be transitive.14
From what has been said, it should be clear that operators for knowledge
and belief, ‘K’ and ‘B’ so defined, do not distribute over implication or
conjunction. One therefore avoids treating agents as logically omniscient.
In [FH88], Fagin and Halpern provide a different modal logic of belief in
which Biφ ∧ Biψ → Bi(φ ∧ ψ) is not valid. Their explanation is based on
‘states of mind’ of the agent—it may believe φ in one state of mind, and
ψ in another, but never put the two together and so never believe φ ∧ ψ.
Such episodes do take place and so, as far as it goes, this is a satisfactory
explanation. However, each frame of mind, considered on its own, must be
perfectly consistent. This sounds much less plausible. It seems perfectly
possible for an agent to have inconsistent beliefs even when these beliefs
are on the very same topic and entertained in the very same frame of mind,
provided that it cannot discover that the beliefs are inconsistent. This shows
the superiority of the bounded rationality account of belief over accounts
such as Fagin and Halpern’s.
Another advantage of the bounded rationality account is that it removes
the temptation to confuse epistemic with metaphysical possibility. That con-
ceivability (viewed as epistemic possibility) does not entail genuine, meta-
physical possibility is evident on this view. We might ask: just what is
an epistemic possibility? There is a temptation here to make too much of
the notion ontologically. What an epistemic possibility is, is nothing more
than the agent’s inability—due to her bounded rationality—to find any ex-
plicit contradictions in what she considers possible. This is why epistemic
possibility cannot be considered on a par with metaphysical possibility: in
14However, it seems sensible to maintain the scheme Kφ→ Bφ. Floridi argues otherwise
elsewhere in this volume, although the reasons he gives independently of his own logic of
information (which is one of those accounts that suffer from the problem of information
overload criticised here) are less than conclusive.
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the epistemic case, what seems possible to an agent really is epistemically
possible for her; though, of course, it might not be metaphysically possible
in the slightest.
I will conclude this discussion by showing how to model becoming in-
formed as an update on a relation ∼i. In becoming informed that p, one no
longer considers any states which satisfy ¬p to be possible. The information
contained in p for agent i can be captured by a restriction on ∼i to worlds
which are not labelled by ¬p. An update by φ thus restricts ∼i to pairs
(s, u) such that u  ♦δiφ. Thus, after becoming informed that φ, i will not
consider ¬φ to be possible. Similarly, becoming informed that ¬φ implies
that i will not consider φ to be possible, as well as not considering ¬¬φ to
be possible (because ¬φ can produce a contradictory pair with either φ or
¬¬φ). However, we should note that such updates can only be said to lead
to an agent being informed at consistent states, i.e. states s for which s∗
is a possible world. Impossible worlds contain no information whatsoever.
From our definitions, we can see that informing an agent i that φ ∧ ψ has
the same effect as informing an agent j that φ and that ψ, provided that δj
is in the range δi±1 and that both agents use conjunction introduction and
elimination rules.
To see how this account is advantageous, let us return to the example
of agent a, who is informed that p ∨ q ∨ r, that ¬p and that ¬q but for
whom it is open whether r is true (recall that we set δa = 1). It is a
logical truth that r follows from a’s information, but this does not prevent
us from informing a that r. This is just as it should be. As discussed
in section 3, the consequences of an agent’s information, including logical
truths, can be informative. I trust this highlights the benefits of the bounded
rationality account of epistemic possibility over the traditional notion in
terms of metaphysically or logically possible worlds.
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